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The US has long incentivized retirement saving in 401(k) and similar retirement accounts by 
permitting workers to defer taxes on contributions, levying them instead when retirees withdraw 
funds in retirement. This paper develops a dynamic life cycle model to show how and whether 
‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – would alter household 
saving, investment, and Social Security claiming patterns. We show that these changes differ 
importantly for low- versus higher-paid workers. We conclude that moving to a system that 
taxes pension contributions instead of withdrawals will lead to later retirement ages, particularly 
for the better-educated. It would also reduce work hours and lifetime tax payments and increase 
consumption inequality in retirement. In addition, we show how these behaviors would differ 
in a persistently low interest rate environment versus a more “normal” historical return world. 
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How Would 401(k) ‘Rothification’ Alter  
Saving, Retirement Security, and Inequality? 
 
The US has long incentivized retirement saving by deferring taxes on workers’ pension 
contributions until the assets are withdrawn in old age, at which point the withdrawn funds 
become subject to income tax. In this way, most 401(k) retirement accounts are taxed according 
to an “EET” regime: workers contribute out of pre-tax earnings, recognize pre-tax investment 
earnings in their accounts, and pay income tax on withdrawals during retirement.  This policy 
has a large current budgetary cost: the US Treasury foregoes over $100 billion per year due to 
tax-deferred contributions to 401(k) and similar plans (Thornton 2017).1 Partly because of 
projected federal budget shortfalls, some policymakers have recently proposed eliminating or 
capping tax-qualified retirement plan contributions, a practice termed ‘Rothification,’ named 
after Senator William Roth who successfully passed legislation allowing this in 1997. 
Specifically, the idea would be to treat all future retirement contributions to a “TEE” regime, 
in which workers would contribute to their pensions out of after-tax income, and then no 
additional tax would be levied thereafter (Schoeff 2017).   
The Rothification idea has been a topic of considerable recent discussion, with former 
President Obama recommending a pre-tax pension contribution cap in 2015, and related 
proposals were offered by the Trump Administration during the 2017 tax reform debate. 
Though those proposals were not enacted, the topic is certain to be revisited given the amount 
of revenue involved. In an economy with a single tax rate and a flat benefit system, taxing 
benefits now versus later is unlikely to change behavior. Yet in the US economy, there are 
numerous nonlinearities in the tax and Social Security systems which render less obvious the 
ways in which such a reform might alter household behavior.  Accordingly, if such a reform 
                                                 
1 The Federal Government does receive some of the deferred tax revenue later when benefits are paid out, but 
retirees are often in a lower tax bracket than when working. Moreover the deferral of taxes tends to mean that the 
revenue is not ‘captured’ in the traditional 10-year accounting window used for revenue neutrality calculations. 
Hence moving the tax capture forward is politically appealing to some; see Sibaie (2017). 
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were to be passed in the future, it could have important implications for household behavior. 
Moreover, effects are likely to vary across different population subgroups.  
To date, however, there has been no coherent microeconomic analysis of how 
Rothification could alter household consumption, saving, retirement patterns, and tax-
payments. Our paper fills this gap by developing a richly detailed and state-of-the-art life cycle 
stochastic dynamic model with endogenous work effort, portfolio choice, consumption, saving, 
and Social Security claiming patterns, to evaluate such a policy’s potential effects for the 
population overall and for different population subgroups. Of key importance is heterogeneity: 
that is, how outcomes will differ for workers with different lifetime earnings profiles. For 
instance, some have argued that “Roths may not, in fact, work out to be a better deal” for low 
income people (Tergesen 2017), while others argue the opposite.2 We therefore assess how key 
outcomes change for a variety of worker-types differentiated by sex and education.   
Additionally, it is important to recognize that converting retirement plans to Roth plans 
would take place against the backdrop of the new income tax structure implemented in 2018 
which reduced the tax burden for most earners.3 The tax reform therefore also changed the 
relative attractiveness of saving for retirement in an EET environment, since lower marginal 
tax rates on workers’ earnings decreased the attractiveness of saving in 401(k) accounts. Our 
research therefore also compares how work, saving, benefit claiming behavior, and tax 
payments would respond in an EET versus TEE setting, for a heterogeneous set of workers.   
Finally, we analyze how our results would differ if the economy were to move out of 
the very low interest rate environment of the last decade, and return to a more “normal” regime. 
We know that persistent low returns spur workers to save and invest differently and can also 
drive different decisions about how long to work and when to claim Social Security benefits 
                                                 
2 Hallez (2017) reports that some predict that low-wage workers would save less in a TEE regime, whereas Statman 
(2017) concluded the opposite.  
3 This tax reform doubled the standard deduction to calculate taxable income, cut marginal tax rates, and raised 
tax brackets, especially for high earners. (IRS 2018) 
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(Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 2018). The quantitative easing policies of the US Federal 
Reserve Bank after the financial crisis have resulted in extraordinarily low real US Treasury 
yields over the past decade, compared to the normal historical real return of 3% (1989-2008).4  
We seek to study how appealing Rothification might be in this new low interest rate 
environment, compared to the traditional EET framework for the $5 trillion invested in 40(k) 
assets.  
   In what follows, we first build and calibrate a structural life cycle model assuming an 
EET framework calibrated to US federal/state income tax and Social Security/Medicare 
premium structures and realistic Social Security benefit formulas including adjustments for 
early and delayed claiming. Importantly, the baseline model also incorporates real-world rules 
characterizing EET tax-qualified 401(k) accounts including the current caps on 401(k) pre-tax 
contributions, employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required 
Minimum Distribution withdrawals. We show that our results agree closely with observed 
consumption, saving, and Social Security claiming age behavior of U.S. households, while 
matching the current distribution of 401(k) wealth rather nicely. 
   Next, we develop results under an alternative environment where 401(k) contributions 
are taxed according to a TEE structure. This permits us to identify changes in behavior for the 
heterogeneous workers described above, under the two tax regimes (EET versus TEE). Next, 
we compare results with those obtained in a higher real return environment.  In particular, we 
assess whether the lower-paid behave differently from the higher-paid in terms of savings inside 
and outside the tax-qualified accounts, as well as in non-pension savings accounts, and whether 
they would change their claiming behavior for Social Security benefits. In addition, we are 
interested in how Rothification would alter the distribution of retirement incomes relative to the 
current EET-system. For example, the gap between high and low-wage workers’ take home pay 
                                                 
4Based on our analysis using DataStream of US Treasury rates deflated by the CPI.  
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is not diminished by income taxes under an EET system, whereas it is under a TEE program. 
Moreover, the Social Security replacement rate formula is progressive, as it provides relatively 
higher benefits for low-wage workers than for the higher paid. Given this, an EET scheme 
enhances the progressivity of overall old age income (pension account withdrawals plus Social 
Security benefits), whereas a TEE structure treats retirement benefits more neutrally. 
Accordingly, it is theoretically unclear how Rothification will alter household behavior without 
modeling the rich institutional details confronting real-world consumers, along with the 
economic environment, capital and labor market risk, and uncertain lifetimes. The paper also 
compares expected household tax payments over the life cycle under both the EET and TEE 
regimes.  We conclude that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed 
retirement, lower lifetime tax payments, reductions in consumption, and higher consumption 
inequality.  Retirement asset accumulation is also lower under the Rothification regime. 
 
Related Literature 
  This research builds on prior work (Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 2018, 2019) by 
exploring the impact of a Rothification reform for 401(k) plans. Here we add to the literature 
by delving into the distributional impacts of such a reform in both a “normal” and a low return 
environment, while accounting for the income tax regime recently adopted. Our work is 
informed by a number of studies using a life cycle framework to model and evaluate how 
individuals respond to a range of environmental shocks. For example, the workhorse model of 
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) was subsequently 
extended by Love (2010) and Hubener, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016), who showed how family 
shocks due to changes in marital status and children alter optimal consumption, insurance, asset 
allocation, and retirement patterns.Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2015) demonstrated 
how capital market surprises can influence saving and portfolio allocation patterns. Gomes, 
Kotlikoff, and Viceira. (2008) and Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) showed how 
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flexible work patterns can help people hedge both earnings and capital market risk. Gomes, 
Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009) demonstrated the impact of taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts on optimal saving over the lifecycle. 
 In the present paper, we evaluate how people might optimally respond to a TEE versus the 
current EET tax regime for retirement accounts by adjusting their consumption, saving, 
investment, and retirement patterns. In addition we analyze these possible changes in optimal 
behavior if the capital market were to move away from a persistently low return environment 
to what used to be perceived as the “normal” return environment. In contrast to our life cycle 
model in Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (forthcoming), we do not include annuity purchases 
but we do allow flexible work effort and endogenous claiming of Social Security benefits.5    
 
The Consumer’s Lifecycle Problem: Model and Calibration  
In what follows, we build and calibrate a structural dynamic consumption and portfolio 
choice model for an individual maximizing his utility over his life cycle using a richly specified, 
sophisticated formulation of lifetime behavior calibrated to US federal/state income tax and 
Social Security/Medicare premium structures, along with realistic Social Security benefit 
formulas.6 Just as importantly, the baseline model also incorporates real-world rules 
characterizing EET tax-qualified 401(k) accounts including the current U.S. caps on 401(k) pre-
tax contributions, employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required 
Minimum Distribution withdrawal amounts. Results using calibrated baseline parameters agree 
closely with observed consumption, saving, and Social Security claiming age patterns of U.S. 
households. Specifically, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62 
                                                 
5 We also provide a theoretical backing for the empirical claiming age patterns identified by Shoven and Slavov 
(2012, 2014). 
6In particular, we take account of Social Security PIA and AIME formulas, as well as early and delayed retirement 
adjustments, and full retirement ages.   
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along with a second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age, and the model also 
matches the current distribution of 401(k) wealth rather nicely (Horneff et al. 2018).  
Preferences. We work in discrete time and assume that the worker’s decision period starts at 
𝑡𝑡 =  1  (age 25) and ends at 𝑇𝑇 = 76 (age 100); accordingly, each period corresponds to one 
year. The household has an uncertain lifetime, such that the probability to survive from 𝑡𝑡 until 
the next year 𝑡𝑡 +  1  is denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. Survival rates entering into the utility function are taken 
from the US Population Life Table (Arias 2010). Preferences are represented by a Cobb 
Douglas function 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) =  
(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼)1−𝜌𝜌
1−𝜌𝜌
 based on current consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and leisure time 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 
(normalized as a fraction of total available time). The parameter 𝛼𝛼 measures leisure preferences; 
𝜌𝜌 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; and 𝛽𝛽 is the time preference factor. The recursive 
definition of the value function is given by:  
 
𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 =
(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼)1−𝜌𝜌
1 − 𝜌𝜌
+ 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1 ) , 
   (1) 
with terminal utility 
 
𝐽𝐽𝑇𝑇 =
�𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇
𝛼𝛼�1−𝜌𝜌
1−𝜌𝜌
 and 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 1 after retirement. We calibrate the preference 
parameters so our results match empirical claiming rates reported by the US Social Security 
Administration and average assets in tax-qualified retirement plans. This matching procedure 
produces preference parameters of 𝛼𝛼 = 1.2, 𝜌𝜌 = 5 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96 (for details, see below).  
Time budget, labor income, and Social Security retirement benefits. As in Horneff et al. 
(2019), our model allows for flexible work effort and retirement ages. The worker has the 
opportunity to allocate up to (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) = 0.6 of his available time budget to paid work (assuming 
100 waking hours per week and 52 weeks per year). Depending on his work effort, the uncertain 
yearly before-tax labor income is given by:  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) · 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 · 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1.    (2) 
Here 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is a deterministic wage rate component which depends on age, education, sex, and an 
indicator for whether the individual works full time, part time, or overtime. The variable 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 =
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𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 · 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+1 is the permanent component of wage rates with independent lognormal distributed 
shocks 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σP2 , σ𝑃𝑃2), having a mean of one and volatility of σ𝑃𝑃2 . In addition, 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σU2 , σ𝑈𝑈2 )  is a transitory shock with volatility σ𝑈𝑈2  and assumed uncorrelated with 
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡.  
The calibration of the deterministic component of the wage rate process 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and the 
variances of the permanent and transitory wage shocks 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is based on 1975–2015 waves 
of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We estimate these separately by sex and  
educational level, where the latter groupings are less than High School, High School graduate, 
and at least some college (<HS, HS, Coll+); see Appendix A, Table A1.  
Between ages 62 and 70, a worker may retire from work and claim Social Security 
benefits. The benefit formula is an overall concave piece-wise linear function of the worker’s 
average indexed lifetime earnings. Accordingly, this provides an annual unreduced Social 
Security benefit – also named Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) – equal (in 2015) to 90 percent 
of (12 times) the first $826 of average indexed monthly earnings, plus 32 percent of average 
indexed monthly earnings over $826 and through $4,980, plus 15 percent of average indexed 
monthly earnings over $4,980 and through the cap $9,875.7 Should an individual claim benefits 
before (after) his system-defined Normal Retirement Age of 66, his lifelong Social Security 
benefits will be permanently reduced (increased) according to pre-specified factors. If the 
individual were to work beyond age 62, the model stipulates that he devote at least one hour 
per week; also, our model rules out overtime work in retirement (i.e. 0.01 ≤ (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) ≤ 0.4). 
Wealth dynamics during the work life. During the work life, an individual has the opportunity 
to use current cash on hand for consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and investments. Some portion 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   of the 
worker’s pre-tax salary 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  (up to a limit of $18,000 per year) can be invested into a tax-qualified 
                                                 
7 See US SSA (nd_a) and US SSA (nd-b). Following Chai et al. 2011 in the optimization the PIA is approximated 
using the permanent income; in the simulation of optimal life cycle we use the 35 best years of earnings to specify 
the PIA and adjust the corresponding permanent income state.  
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401(k)-retirement plan of the EET or TEE type. Also, from age 50 onwards, he is permitted an 
additional $6,000 of ‘catch-up’ contributions. In addition, a worker can invest outside his 
retirement plan in risky stocks 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and riskless bonds 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡. Hence, cash on hand 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 in each year 
can is given by: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡.    (3) 
In addition to the usual constraints, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, the worker may not contribute more than 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ≤ $18,000 in the 401(k) plan (as per US law). One year later, his cash on hand is given by 
the value of stocks (bonds) having earned an uncertain (riskless) gross return of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓), plus 
income from work (after housing costs ℎ𝑡𝑡), plus withdrawals  (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡) from the 401(k) plan, minus 
any federal/state/city taxes and Social Security contributions, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1, and health insurance 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
costs: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡.    (4) 
We model housing costs ℎ𝑡𝑡 as in Love (2010). Our “baseline” financial market 
parameterizations assume a risk-free interest rate of 1%, and an equity risk premium of 4% with 
a return volatility of 18%. In subsequent simulations, we work with a higher interest rate of 3%, 
reflective of the more historically normal capital market returns. The annual cost of health 
insurance 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is set at $1200. As in Lusardi, Michaud and Mitchell (2017), if a worker’s cash 
on hand were to fall below 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 ≤ $5,879 p.a., the model posits that he receives a minimum 
welfare benefit of $5,879 the next year. 
Taxation and evolution of retirement plans: During the work life and retirement, households 
must pay various taxes (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1) which reduce cash on hand available for consumption and 
investment. The amount and timing of these tax payments over the life cycle differ significantly 
in the case of an EET versus TEE system. 
First, workers must pay payroll taxes 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 amounting to 11.65%, which is the sum of 
1.45% Medicare, 4% city and state tax and 6.2% Social Security tax (up to a cap of 118,500 per 
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year). Payroll taxes are not directly affected by retirement accounts. Second, the individual must 
also pay a progressive federal income tax 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 based on his taxable income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, seven income 
tax brackets, and the corresponding marginal tax rates for each tax bracket (for details, see IRS 
2015a and Appendix B). Taxable income is a complex function of labor earnings, income from 
investments, and contributions into as well as withdrawals from 401(k) plans. Under both 
regimes for tax-qualified retirement accounts that we consider, investment earnings on assets 
are not counted as part of taxable earnings, yet the treatment of contributions (including 
employer matching contributions) and withdrawals differs between the two tax regimes. In the 
EET setup, contributions to the retirement account are tax-exempt (E) up to a limit, while 
withdrawals are part of taxable income (T). Technically, this means that employer matching 
contributions are not part of taxable income, while own contributions can be subtracted from 
taxable income. In the TEE case, contributions (including matching employer contributions) 
are taxed, but withdrawal are tax exempt. Technically, this means that own contributions cannot 
be deducted from taxable income, and employer matching contributions are added to taxable 
income. To sidestep liquidity problems due to back tax payments, we assume that employer 
contributions are taxed directly at the source, based on the worker’s personal income tax rate. 
This generates a tax burden of 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, which reduces the contribution into the TEE account as 
well as the income tax amount.8  
Finally, in line with US regulation, the individual must also pay penalty tax of 10% on 
early withdrawals from 401(k) accounts prior to age 59 ½ (𝑡𝑡 = 36). This rules applies for both 
the TEE and EET regime: 
EET 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 +  𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  
 
 (5) 
                                                 
8 Actual Roth-401(k) regulation requires that employer contributions are taxed according to the EET regime, which 
requires a separate account for own versus employer contributions. This would require an additional state variable 
in our models, greatly increasing the computational burden required to solve the models, so we do not follow that 
approach here.  
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TEE  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + (𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  
 
Next, we describe the development of the tax-qualified retirement account in the life-
cycle model. Prior to the endogenous retirement age 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾, the worker’s assets in his tax-
qualified retirement plan are invested in bonds earning a risk-free gross (pre-tax) return of 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, 
as well as risky stocks paying an uncertain gross return of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡. The total value (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘)) of the 
401(k) assets at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is therefore determined by the previous period’s value minus any 
withdrawals (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘)), plus additional own contributions (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡), plus any employer match 
(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡), and returns on stocks and bonds. To avoid substantial tax penalties from age 70.5 
onwards, retirees must take Required Minimum Distributions from 401(k) plans which are 
based on life expectancy data from the IRS Uniform Lifetime Table (IRS 2015b). In the TEE 
regime, the employer match is reduced by the tax pre-payment 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. The variable 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 denotes 
the relative exposure of overall assets allocated to stocks. Overall, the wealth dynamics of the 
EET or TEE retirement account evolves as follows:  
EET 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1  + (1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) −
Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓    and 
 (6) 
TEE  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 −𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + (1 −
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 −𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓. 
To be considered as a safe harbor 401(k) plan and therefore avoid complex non-
discrimination testing, we assume that the employers match 100% of employee contributions 
up to 5% of yearly labor income.9 Due to regulation, the matching rate can only applied to a 
maximum compensation of $265,000, so the maximum employer contribution is $13,250. The 
matching contribution is then given by: 
                                                 
9 See Willson (2019) for 401(k) safe harbor plans. Love (2007) reports a modal value of 6% for matching rates of 
US defined contribution plans. 
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 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = min(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 0.05𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, $13,250).    (7) 
Wealth dynamics during retirement. The worker can retire and claim Social Security benefits 
between age 62 and 70. After selecting his endogenous retirement age, 𝐾𝐾, the individual may 
still elect to save outside the tax-qualified retirement plan in stocks and bonds, as follows: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡.    (8) 
His cash on hand for the next period evolves as follows: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1− ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1.   (9) 
Old age retirement benefits provided by Social Security are determined by the worker’s Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA), which in turn depend on his average lifetime earnings as described 
above. Social Security payments (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 ) in retirement (𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾) are given by:  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 ⋅  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1  .            (10) 
Here, 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 is the mandated adjustment factor for claiming before or after the system-defined Full 
Retirement Age, which in our model is assumed to be age 66.10 The variable 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  is a transitory 
shock 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  ~LN(−0.5𝜎𝜎ℇ
2,𝜎𝜎ℇ2), which reflects out-of-pocket medical and other expenditure shocks 
in retirement (as in Love 2010). During retirement, benefits payments from Social Security are 
partially taxed by the individual federal income tax rate as well as the 4% city and state and 
1.45% Medicare taxes.11 We model the 401(k) plan payouts as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt�Rt+1
+ (1 −𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑡 <  𝐾𝐾.  
 (10) 
                                                 
10 The factors we use are 0.75 (claiming age 62), 0.8 (claiming age 63), 0.867 (claiming age 64), 0.933 (claiming 
age 65), 1.00 (claiming age 66), 1.08 (claiming age 67), 1.16 (claiming age 68), 1.24 (claiming age 69), and 1.32 
(claiming age 70); see US SSA (nd_c). 
11 For Social Security tax rules see US SSA (nd_d). Up to 85% of Social Security benefits may be subject to 
income tax for higher-income households, yet due to generous exemptions, many households receive their Social 
Security benefits tax-free. From age 65 onward, benefits are not taxed by Social Security or Medicare Part A 
(hospital insurance). Nevertheless, most elderly enroll in Medicare Part B (medical insurance), Part C (advantage 
plans), and Part D (drug prescription), and pay premiums. To simplify calculations, we assume that these premiums 
equal 1.45% of benefits. 
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Under US law, plan participants must take retirement account payouts from age 70 onwards, 
according to the Required Minimum Distribution rules (m) specified by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS 2015b). Accordingly, withdrawals from the retirement account must take into 
account the following constraints: 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘)𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 <  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘). 
Calibration of preference parameters and model solution.  We posit that households 
maximize the value function (1) subject to the constraints and calibrations set out above, by 
optimally selecting their consumption, work effort, claiming age for Social Security benefits, 
investments and withdrawals from tax-qualified 401(k)-plans, and investments in as well as 
redemptions of stocks and bonds. As this optimization problem cannot be solved analytically, 
it requires a numerical procedure using dynamic stochastic programming. Accordingly, to 
generate optimal policy functions, in each period 𝑡𝑡 we discretize the space in four dimensions 
30(X)×20(𝐹𝐹401(𝑘𝑘))×8(P)×9(K), with 𝑋𝑋 being cash on hand, 𝐹𝐹401(𝑘𝑘) assets held in the 401(k) 
retirement plan, P permanent income, and K the claiming age. Next, we simulate 100,000 
independent life cycles based on optimal feedback controls for each of the six population 
subgroups of interest (male/female with <HS, HS, and Coll+). We then aggregate the subgroups 
to obtain national mean values using weights from the National Center on Education Statistics 
(2016). Specifically, the weights are 50.7% female (61% with Coll+, 28% with HS, and 11% 
with <HS), and 49.3% male (57% with Coll+, 30% HS, and 13% <HS). 
We calibrate preference parameters (assumed to unique for the six subgroup) in such a 
way that our model results match empirical claiming rates reported by the US Social Security 
Administration (US SSA 2015) and average assets in 401(k) plans. Our baseline calibration 
assumes a risk-free interest rate of 1%, and also that people have access to tax qualified 401(k) 
retirement accounts under the EET regime. Specifically, we calibrate our model to data from 
the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2017) which reports 401(k) account balances for 7.3 
million plan participants in five age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69) in 2015. 
To generate 401(k) simulated balances and claiming rates, we first solve the life cycle model 
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where the individual has access to traditional EET 401(k) plans under the tax-regime in 2015 
(i.e. before the reform in 2018); we then generate 100,000 lifecycles using optimal feedback 
controls for each of the six subgroups (male/female with <HS, HS, and Coll+). These six 
subgroups are aggregated to obtain national median values, using National Center on Education 
Statistics (2016) weights. Finally, to compare our results to the EBRI (2017) data, we construct 
average account levels for each of five age subgroups. Repeating this procedure for alternative 
preference parameter sets, we find that a coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ of 5, a time 
discount rate β of 0.96, and a leisure parameter 𝛼𝛼 of 1.2 are the parameters that most closely 
match simulated model outcomes and empirical evidence on both 401(k) balances and claiming 
rates of Social Security Benefits.12  
Figure 1 (top) presents claiming rates generated by our life cycle model (dark bars) 
versus empirical claiming rates (light bars) reported by the US Social Security Administration 
(2015) for the year 2015 for nondisabled males and females. Here we see that our model closely 
tracks the empirically-observed early claiming age peak at age 62, as well as the second peak 
at the Full Retirement Age (66). The lower Panel of Figure 1 displays simulated versus 
empirical evidence on 401(k) assets by age groups. Again, our simulated outcomes are 
remarkably close to the empirically-observed 401(k) account values, implying that our model 
accords well with real-world data.   
 Figure 1 here  
 
What Would Rothification Do? 
  We next illustrate how switching from traditional EET to a TEE tax regime for 
retirement savings would affect claiming ages, assets held inside and outside tax-qualified 
retirement plans, consumption, hours of work, asset and consumption inequality, and tax 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, these parameters are also in line with those used in prior work on life-cycle portfolio choice; see 
for instance Brown (2001).   
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payments over the life cycle. In addition, we study how the results would differ, if the very low 
interest rate environment of the last decade (𝑓𝑓 = 1%) were to be replaced by a more historically 
“normal” return regime (𝑓𝑓 = 3%).  
Asset accumulation patterns. Table 1 offers an accounting of how the tax regime change alters 
asset allocation patterns in the 401(k) accounts versus non tax-qualified assets. Here we focus on 
lifecycle asset accumulation patterns under the EET/TEE regimes, as well as the low/high expected 
return scenarios. Most strikingly, we see that assets in 401(k) plans (Panel A) are lower under the 
Rothification regime, particularly in later life, compared to the higher levels under the EET regime. 
This shortfall is greater in the higher return regime, such that tax qualified assets are always larger 
in the EET environment. By contrast, non-qualified assets are markedly lower in the EET world 
from age 60 onward, by about half as of the Full Retirement Age (i.e., the mid-60s). Yet in terms 
of consumption opportunities, the value of retirement plan assets in the EET regime is not directly 
comparable with that in the TEE regime. This is because withdrawals of EET assets must be taxed 
before they can used for consumption, while withdrawals from TEE assets are tax free.  
Table 1 here 
Impacts on consumption and work hours. Table 2 evaluates the effects of moving from an EET 
to a TEE regime on consumption patterns and work hours, for low and high interest rates (𝑓𝑓 =
1% and 3%). In the low interest rate regime, EET lifetime consumption is below that in the TEE 
world from age 40 onward. Panel B also reveals that people work about three more hours per week 
in the TEE scenario during the Social Security claiming window (age 62-69).  If the real return 
were instead 𝑓𝑓 = 3%, average consumption under TEE would be lower for all age groups, 
compared to the EET case. In addition, during the work life, work effort would be about two hours 
per week lower under TEE. Nevertheless, in the Social Security benefit claiming window, people 
work about three hours more per week under the TEE regime. Overall, Rothification reduces work 
over the lifetime but pushes out retirement claiming, compared to the EET tax environment. 
Table 2 here 
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Impact on claiming ages. Table 3 shows how Social Security benefit claiming ages would 
change by sex across tax regimes and under the low versus high interest rate scenarios. In both 
tax regimes men and women’s average retirement ages are later when interest rates are low 
(𝑓𝑓 = 1%). This is because delaying Social Security is similar to buying a deferred annuity.13 
Hence it is more attractive to draw down one’s 401(k) account to delay Social Security 
claiming, compared to keeping the money in the retirement account and earning (uncertain) 
investment returns.  
  Overall, the TEE regime’s lower marginal tax rate on 401(k) payouts induces workers 
to defer Social Security claiming more than under the EET regime. This may be explained as 
follows: some workers with sufficient retirement plan assets want to retire, but they find it 
attractive to wait to claim Social Security so as to boost these via the delayed claiming factors 
(6-8% increase per year of delayed claiming). Meanwhile, financing consumption during this 
no-work phase requires them to withdraw from their 401(k) assets. Under an EET regime, 
workers must pay income taxes on their pension withdrawals; thus the attraction of earning 
higher Social Security benefits by delaying claiming must be weighed against the disadvantage 
of paying high income taxes on withdrawals. If the tax burden on withdrawals is heavier than 
the advantage of receiving higher Social Security benefits, it is rational to claim earlier. This 
tradeoff must also take into account the fact that only a portion of Social Security benefits are 
included in taxable income (up to 50% could be tax-free). Accordingly, the net-of-tax gain from 
delaying Social Security claiming is relatively small in the EET scenario. The effect is stronger 
when interest rates are high, because workers build more assets in their 401(k) accounts.  
  Such complex tax considerations are irrelevant under the TEE regime, because pension 
withdrawals are not counted as part of taxable income. Therefore, given their financial 
resources to finance consumption until claiming, in the TEE scenario workers base their 
                                                 
13 Naturally, the price of the annuity varies with the market return. For instance, the implied interest rate to price 
an annuity comparable to Social Security in the private market would range between 2 and 5%, depending on the 
retiree’s age and sex. See Hubener et al. (2016), Shoven and Slavov (2014), and Maurer et al 2017. 
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decisions to delay claiming only on delayed retirement credit earned by deferring Social 
Security. Moreover, this effect is stronger under a high versus a low interest rate regime. 
Table 3 here  
  The average claiming age changes do obscure some interesting differences across 
population subgroups, as can be seen in Figure 2. Specifically, claiming behavior of the least-
educated high school dropouts is relatively similar in the EET and TEE regimes, primarily 
because this group saves and accumulates fewer assets than the better-educated. Moreover, the 
changes in claiming ages for this group are small under both interest rate environments. For 
example, women (men) without a high school degree work only 0.5 (3) month more under the 
TEE regime in a low interest rate environment, while Coll+ men and women defer claiming 
benefits by more than a year under both interest rate environments. The impact is strongest for 
college-educated females who work 16 months longer given a high real rate, in the TEE versus 
EET setup. Accordingly, more educated and wealthier workers are predicted to work 
substantially longer under Rothification, with a much smaller impact on the less-educated. 
Figure 2 here 
Impacts on tax payments over the life cycle. Next, in Figure 3 we plot the average tax 
payments per individual over the life cycle under the EET and TEE regimes. The figure includes 
payroll taxes, income taxes, and penalty taxes for early withdrawals for the overall population 
comprised by our six subgroups. Both scenarios assume a low and persistent interest rate of 
1%. As anticipated, tax payments under EET are lower during the first 25 years of the worklife, 
since 401(k) contributions are not part of taxable income; by contrast, under the TEE regime, 
workers must pay taxes on both own and employer matching contributions. Yet the situation 
changes around age 50 when tax payments rise in the EET regime, and the difference is 
particularly marked between ages 62 and 70. Thereafter, tax payments in both the EET and TEE 
scenarios are relatively low.  
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The explanation is that, in both tax regimes, workers begin curtailing their work hours 
after age 50 and finance their consumption by 401(k) withdrawals. From age 60 onward, 401(k) 
withdrawals are not subject to the 10% penalty tax in both tax regimes, but withdrawals from 
EET accounts are part of taxable income which results in higher tax payments – in contrast to 
the TEE world. The difference in tax payment is particularly large between ages 62 and 70. For 
example, at age 65, the annual EET tax payment averages $8,000, or about twice as large as in 
the Roth regime. This result is driven by individuals who have relatively large accumulations 
in their 401(k) plans and use these assets to (partially) retire from work, delay claiming Social 
Security benefits, and spend retirement assets to cover consumption until claiming. From age 
70 onwards, most of the 401(k) assets are spent so people withdraw only small amounts from 
their retirement plans. Hence, retirees in the EET world pay only slightly more taxes than those 
in the TEE world.  
Figure 3 here 
Table 4 shows numerical values of average lifetime tax payments per individual for the 
two tax regimes and interest rate scenarios under consideration. In all scenarios, we find that  
average tax payments are higher under the EET system until workers attain age 49. For example, 
assuming 𝑓𝑓 = 1%, workers pay about $11,000 more in taxes under the TEE system up to that 
age. Yet between ages 50-69, workers in the EET regime pay $26,000 more than in the TEE 
world. Over the complete life cycle, tax payments average 6% ($24,000) more in the EET world 
when the interest rate is low; the difference increases to about 10% ($42,000) if the real rate is 
3%. Overall, we conclude that tax payments are higher in the short run in the TEE regime, but 
lower in the long run.     
Table 4 here 
Impact on Inequality 
  Last, we evaluate how a TEE versus an EET tax regime for retirement savings affects 
asset and consumption inequality. For the three population subgroups and the ETT versus TEE 
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tax regimes, Table 5 reports average wealth inside and outside tax-qualified accounts as of age 
62, as well as average income and average consumption between ages 25-62. Panel A depicts 
results for the low and Panel B for the high interest rate scenario.  
Table 5 here 
  Following Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell (2017), we measure relative wealth, income, 
and consumption inequality in terms of the ratio of college graduates to high school dropouts 
as of age 62. The higher is this ratio, the greater the inequality along this dimension. Regardless 
of the interest rate environment, we see that inequality measured this way is greater under the 
TEE regime, for three out of four metrics. For example, under the EET regime, a Coll+ 
individual receives 3.73 times the income of the <HS group in the low interest regime; this 
differential rises to 3.81 under the TEE tax setup. Additionally, consumption inequality is 
slightly larger under the TEE regime, and inequality of assets outside tax-qualified accounts 
rises substantially, for both interest rate scenarios. In contrast, 401(k) assets are less unequal 
under the TEE regime, though it must be recalled that asset levels in 401(k) accounts cannot be 
directly compared across the two tax regimes, since 401(k) assets are subject to tax on 
withdrawal and under the TEE regime, such assets are not taxed. Furthermore, the marginal tax 
rate for <HS who have only about $14,000 in their 401(k) accounts is far lower than for their 
Coll+ counterparts who have over $210,000 in their 401(k) accounts.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper evaluates whether adopting a different tax treatment of retirement plan 
contributions would materially change Social Security benefit claiming ages and work hours, 
consumption, and asset allocation of workers looking ahead to retirement. We also assess 
whether the lower-paid would behave differently from the higher-paid, in terms of change in 
claiming, saving inside and outside the Roth accounts, and non-pension saving. Rothification 
also alters the distribution of retirement incomes relative to the current EET-system. For 
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example, the gap between high and low-wage workers’ take home pay is not diminished by 
income taxes under an EET system, whereas it is under a TEE program. Moreover, the Social 
Security replacement rate formula is progressive, as it provides relatively higher benefits for 
low-wage workers than for the higher paid. Given these realities, an EET scheme enhances the 
progressivity of overall old age income (pension account withdrawals plus Social Security 
benefits), whereas a TEE structure treats pension benefits more neutrally. Accordingly, it is 
theoretically impossible to predict how Rothification will alter household behavior without 
taking into account the rich institutional details confronting real-world consumers, along with 
the economic environment, capital and labor market risk, and uncertain lifetimes.  
Our structural model is a richly specified, sophisticated formulation of lifetime behavior 
calibrated to US federal/state income tax and Social Security/Medicare premium structures, 
along with realistic Social Security benefit formulas. We account for PIA and AIME formulas, 
early and delayed retirement adjustments under Social Security, and real-world rules 
characterizing tax-qualified DC accounts including the current caps on pre-tax contributions, 
employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required Minimum 
Distribution withdrawals.  This lifecycle model of work, saving, consumption, and retirement 
behavior provides several lessons for those interested in an alternative tax regime for pension 
plans. Overall, we show that that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to 
later retirement ages, especially for the better-educated. It also reduces lifetime work hours, and 
increases consumption inequality. While there is some sensitivity to market returns, our overall 
conclusions remain robust to the alternative assumptions explored here. Finally, lifetime tax 
payments are lower by 6-10% under the Rothification tax regime.  
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Figure 1: Social Security Claiming Patterns for Males and Females, and 401(k) Asset 
Values (model vs data)  
 
   A: Female                B: Male  
  
Notes: The top two panels compare claiming rates generated by our life cycle models and empirical claiming rates 
reported by the US Social Security Administration (see US SSA 2015) for the year 2015 (without disability). 
Expected values are calculated from 100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls. Results for 
the entire female (male) population are computed using income profile for three education levels: 61% +Coll; 
28% HS; 11% <HS (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS). Parameters used for the baseline calibration are as follows: 
risk aversion 𝜌𝜌 = 5; time preference 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96; leisure preference 𝛼𝛼 =  1.2; endogenous retirement age 62-70. 
Social Security benefits are based on average permanent income and the bend points in place in 2015; minimum 
required withdrawals from 401(k) plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform Lifetime Table in 
2015; tax rules for 401(k) plans are as of 2015 and described in Appendix B. The risk premium for stocks returns 
is 5% and return volatility 18%; the risk free rate in the baseline case is 1%. The lower panel compares empirical 
401(k) account balances across the US population. Empirical account balance data are taken from the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute (2017); age groups referred to as 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s denote average values for 
persons age 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69. Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 2: Average Claiming Age Differences by Education: TEE (Roth) vs EET Tax 
Regimes, and Low vs High Return Scenarios 
 
A: Female      B: Male    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: We report the average claiming age difference for  EET vs TEE for r=1% and 3% by sex and education groups 
<HS, HS, +Coll, derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls from the life cycle 
model. Preference parameters are as follows: risk aversion 𝜌𝜌 = 5; time preference 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96; leisure preference 𝛼𝛼 =
 1.2. The endogenous retirement age is between age 62-70.The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and 
return volatility 18%. Tax bracket are based on 2018 regulations (as described in Appendix B). Source: Authors’ 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Months
<H
S 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 H
S
Co
ll+
3% Interest rate
1% Interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
Months
<H
S 
   
   
   
   
   
 H
S 
   
 
Co
ll+
3% Interest rate
1% Interest rate
25 
 
Figure 3: Average Annual Tax Payments per Individual: EET vs TEE (Roth) Tax 
Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
$0
00
l
Age
EET
TEE
Notes: The table reports average annual tax payments (sum of income taxes, payroll taxes, and penalty tax 
for early withdrawals) over the life cycle per individual for EET versus TEE taxation based on low interest 
rates (1%). Values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles for each of the six subgroups (male / female 
and three education groups) using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. Results for the entire 
population are computed using the following weights for the three education levels: females (61% +Coll; 
28% HS; 11% <HS) and males (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS); the weights for females is 51% and for 
males 49%. Further notes on parameters see Figure 2. 
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Table 1: Lifecycle Asset Accumulation Patterns under EET versus TEE Tax Regimes, and 
Low versus High Expected Return Scenarios 
 
 r=1 % r=3 % 
  EET TEE EET TEE 
Panel A: 401(k) Assets ($000)    
 Age 30-39  54.8 46.6 61.5 51.5 
 Age 40-49  130.6 110.2 149.5 114 
 Age 50-59  174.7 147.3 201.7 148.8 
 Age 60-69  127.1 91.1 162.9 105.3 
 Age 70-79  87.6 67.1 128.6 94.9 
 Age 80-89  43.6 34.3 75.5 58 
 Age 90-99  8.8 6.6 18.9 14.7 
 
Panel B: Non-Qualified Assets ($000)   
 Age 30-39  6.3 5.6 7.2 5.7 
 Age 40-49  8.9 8.2 7.9 6.9 
 Age 50-59  8.1 8.6 6.4 7.9 
 Age 60-69  16.7 31.5 16.6 30.5 
 Age 70-79  10.9 16.2 11.9 11.7 
 Age 80-89  7.7 8.7 8.5 6.8 
 Age 90-99  5.4 6 5.7 5.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The two panels show expected assets by age in tax-qualified 401(k) plans and non-qualified assets for low 
and high interest rate (1% and 3%), and different tax regimes. Expected values are based on 100,000 simulated 
lifecycles using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns 
is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other parameters, see Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
27 
 
Table 2: Life Cycle Consumption and Working Hours under EET versus TEE Tax 
Regimes, and Low versus High Expected Return Scenarios 
 
 
 
  r=1 % r=3 % 
  EET TEE EET TEE 
Panel A: Consumption ($000) 
 Age 30-39  24.0 23.7 24.3 21.3 
 Age 40-49  27.8 28.0 28.5 24.9 
 Age 50-59  29.5 30.2 30.2 27.0 
 Age 60-69  27.9 29.1 29.5 26.6 
 Age 70-79  24.8 25.2 27.3 24.0 
 Age 80-89  23.4 23.9 26.4 23.9 
 Age 90-99  20.8 21.8 22.9 22.1 
 
Panel B:  Av. Work Hours per Week 
 Age 25-61  33.8 33.9 33.2 31.6 
 Age 62- 69  8.8 11.6 6.7 9.4 
 Age 25-69  29.4 29.9 28.5 27.6 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The two panels report average consumption and weekly work hours for low and high r (1% and 3%), and 
different tax regimes. Expected values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback controls 
from the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other 
parameters, see Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 3: Social Security Claiming Patterns (in %) for Females and Males under EET versus 
TEE Tax Regimes, and Low versus High Expected Return Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Female Male 
  r=1 % r=3 % r=1 % r=3 % 
Age EET TEE EET TEE EET TEE EET TEE 
62 42.5 37.8 49.1 37.3 34.6 29.4 36.9 28.6 
63 3.1 3.1 4.9 4.4 4.3 4 6.2 4.1 
64 3.9 2.8 5.6 4.3 4.6 3 7.8 3.1 
65 6.7 4 7.7 6.0 7.9 3.8 10.4 7.1 
66 16 7.3 13.6 8.0 19.8 14.1 17.3 15.5 
67 8 7.5 5.5 11.4 9.3 10 6.9 12.2 
68 7.5 11.4 7 9.1 8.4 11 7.6 12.7 
69 7.2 11 4.2 10.2 5.8 12.3 3.7 8.3 
70 4.9 15.1 2.3 9.3 5.3 12.3 3.2 8.3 
Av. Claim 
Age (years) 64.7 65.5 64.1 65.2 65.0 65.8 64.5 65.6 
Notes: We report the average claiming age for low and high r (1% and 3%) by sex, for the two different tax regimes 
(EET vs TEE) derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls from the life cycle 
model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other parameters, see Figure 
1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Sum of Average Life-Time Tax Payments per Individual:  EET vs TEE (Roth) 
Tax Regimes, and Low versus High Expected Return Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 r = 1 % r = 3 % 
  EET TEE EET TEE 
 Age 25-49 214.6 225.4 213.9 222.7 
 Age 50-69 167.4 141.2 165.8 133.4 
 Age 70-100  43.4 35.2 54.5 36.3 
 Age 25-100  425.4 401.8 434.2 392.4 
Notes: The table reports average life-time tax payments (sum of income taxes, payroll taxes, and penalty 
tax for early withdrawals) per individual for EET versus TEE taxation and for low and high interest rates 
(1% and 3%). Values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles for each of the six subgroups (male / 
female and three education groups) using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. Results for 
the entire population are computed using the following weights for the three education levels: females 
(61% +Coll; 28% HS; 11% <HS) and males (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS); the weights for females is 
51% and for males 49%. Further notes on parameters see Figure 2. 
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Table 5: Asset and Consumption Inequality by Education under EET versus TEE Tax Regimes, and Low versus High Expected Return 
Scenarios 
    EET TEE 
    
Ave. Cash 
on Hand 
@62 
Ave. Pre-
tax 401(k) 
Assets  
@62 
Ave. Pre-
tax Income  
Age 25-62 
Ave. 
Consumption 
Age 25-62 
Ave. Cash 
on Hand 
@62 
Ave. 401(k) 
Assets  
@62 
Ave. Pre-
tax Income  
Age 25-62 
Ave. 
Consumption 
Age 25-62 
Panel A: r= 1%                  
<HS   $19,291 $16,677 $13,940 $11,983 $21,021 $13,039 $13,856 $11,874 
HS   $35,027 $67,193 $28,913 $19,540 $41,311 $50,139 $28,781 $19,395 
Coll+   $58,061 $210,349 $52,016 $32,416 $84,833 $158,400 $52,815 $32,911 
Ratio (Coll+/<HS)   3.01 12.6 3.73 2.71 4.04 12.15 3.81 2.77 
 
Panel B:  r=3%                  
<HS   $21,075 $28,443 $15,177 $12,878 $23,536 $21,969 $15,118 $12,808 
HS   $35,849 $90,032 $28,364 $20,080 $45,039 $67,241 $28,696 $20,143 
Coll+   $57,616 $250,887 $49,173 $32,830 $89,490 $183,962 $50,693 $33,631 
Ratio (Coll+/<HS)   2.73 8.82 3.24 2.55 3.80 8.37 3.35 2.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table reports average cash on hand, 401(k) plan assets, and average annual pre-tax earnings by educational group, for low and high r (1% and 3%) and different 
tax regimes. Expected values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock 
returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other parameters, see Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Online Appendix for How Would 401(k) ‘Rothification’ Alter Saving, Retirement 
Security, and Inequality? 
Vanya Horneff, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
Online Appendix A: Wage rate estimation 
We calibrated the wage rate process using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
1975-2015 from age 25 to 69.  During the work life, each individual’s labor income profile has 
deterministic, permanent, and transitory components with uncorrelated and normally 
distributed shocks according to 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝(𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) ~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2,  𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2) and 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡) ~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2,  𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2). The 
wage rate values are expressed in $2015. These are estimated separately by sex and by 
educational level. The educational groupings are: less than High School (<HS), High School 
graduate (HS), and those with at least some college (Coll+). Extreme observations below $5 
per hour and above the 99th percentile are dropped. 
We use a second order polynomial in age and dummies for employment status. The 
regression function is: 
 ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 ) = 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦2 +  𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑, (A1) 
where log (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦) is the natural log of wage at time y for individual i, age is the age of the 
individual divided by 100, ES is the individual’s employment status, and wave dummies control 
for year-specific shocks.  For employment status, we include three groups depending on work 
hours per week as follows:  part-time worker (≤ 20 hours), full-time worker (< 20 & ≤ 40 hours) 
and overtime worker (< 40 hours). OLS regression results for the wage rate process equations 
are provided in Table A1.  
 To estimate the variances of the permanent and transitory components, we follow 
Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Hubener at al. (2016).  We calculate the difference of the 
observed log wage and the regression result, and we take the difference of these differences 
across different lengths of time d. For individual i, the residual is:   
 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 = ∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑−1𝑠𝑠=0   + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑑𝑑 − 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. (A2) 
 We then regress the 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓𝑓𝚤𝚤,𝑑𝑑2  
����� on the lengths of time d between waves and a constant: 
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ 2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑, (A3) 
where the variance of the permanent factor 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁2 = 𝛽𝛽1 and the 𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈2 = 𝛽𝛽2 represents the variance of 
the transitory shocks. 
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Table A1: Regression results for wage rates 
 
Coefficient 
 
Male <HS Male HS Male +Coll Female <HS Female HS Female +Coll 
              
Age/100 3.161*** 5.972*** 9.092*** 1.256*** 2.767*** 4.731*** 
  (0.108) (0.049) (0.070) (0.110) (0.046) (0.072) 
       
Age²/10000 -3.329*** -6.416*** -9.351*** -1.339*** -2.915*** -4.960*** 
  (0.130) (0.062) (0.089) (0.131) (0.059) (0.094) 
              
Part-time work -0.109*** -0.153*** -0.0826*** -0.0858*** -0.129*** -0.0847*** 
  (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Over-time work 0.00412 0.0506*** 0.0949*** 0.0158*** 0.0748*** 0.106*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
              
Constant 1.807*** 1.435*** 1.151*** 2.051*** 2.015*** 1.938*** 
  (0.042) (0.012) (0.015) (0.037) (0.011) (0.017) 
              
Observations 48,762 327,305 293,386 31,788 290,597 225,211 
R-squared 0.069 0.102 0.147 0.032 0.044 0.092 
              
Permanent 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 
  (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.001) 
       
Transitory 0.028*** 0.031** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
Observations 28,359 175,247 140,984 20,863 176,304 123,145 
R-squared 0.214 0.283 0.307 0.146 0.255 0.264 
 
Notes: Regression results for the natural logarithm of wage rates (in $2015) are based in on information in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for persons age 25-69 in waves 1975-2015. Independent variables 
include age and age-squared, and dummies for part time work (≤20 hours per week) and overtime work (≥ 40 
hours per week). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Online Appendix B: Modeling retirement accounts  
We embed a US-type progressive tax system in our model to explore the impact of 
having access to a qualified (tax-sheltered) pension account of the EET versus the TEE (Roth) 
type.14 (All values are in $2015 and relevant amounts are inflation adjusted yearly).  Here the 
worker must pay taxes on labor income and on capital gains from investments in bonds and 
stocks. During the working life, he invests 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  in a tax-qualified pension account which reduces 
his taxable income; contributions can be made to an annual maximum amount 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡=$18,000 (and 
from age 50 an additional $6,000 catch up is feasible). Correspondingly, withdrawals 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 from 
the tax-qualified account increase taxable income. Finally, the worker’s taxable income is 
reduced by a general standardized deduction 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷. For a single person, this deduction was in 
2015 $6,300 (in 2018 $12,000) per year. Consequently, taxable income during the working age 
is given by:  
EET 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = max�max�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ⋅ (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ⋅ �𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 − 1�;  0� +
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − min(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡;𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝) − 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷; 0�, and 
 
 
 
(B1) 
TEE  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = max�max�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ⋅ (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ⋅ �𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 − 1�;  0� + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 +
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) − 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷; 0�. 
For Social Security (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1) taxation, we use the following rules: when the retiree’s combined 
income15 is between $25,000 and $34,000 (over $34,000), 50% (85%) of benefits are taxed. 
After retirement, we set 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡= 0, i.e. no further contributions in 401(k) retirement plans are 
possible. 
In line with US rules for federal income taxes, our progressive tax system has seven 
income tax brackets (IRS 2015a). These brackets 𝑑𝑑 = 1, … ,7 are defined by a lower and an 
upper bound of taxable income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖] and determine a marginal tax rate 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. In  
2018, the marginal taxes rates for a single household were 10% from $0 to $9,225, 12% from 
$9,225 to $38,700, 22% from $38,701 to $82,500, 24% from $82,501 to $157,500, 32% from 
$157,500 to $200,000 35%  from $200,001 to $500,000 and 37% above $500,000 (see IRS 
2018). Based on these tax brackets, the dollar amount of taxes payable is given by:16 
 
                                                 
14 That is, contributions and investment earnings in the account are tax exempt (E), while payouts are taxed (T). 
15 Combined income is sum of adjusted gross income, nontaxable interest, and half of his Social Security benefits 
(US SSA nd). 
16 Here we assume that capital gains are taxed at the same rate as labor income, so we abstract from the possibility 
that long-term investments may be taxed at a lower rate. 
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𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓7
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏6 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓6
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏5 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓5
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏4 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓4
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏3 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓3
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓2
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏1) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏1� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏1) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 ≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓1
𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B2) 
 
where, for 𝐴𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋𝑋, the indicator function 1𝐴𝐴 → {0, 1} is defined as: 
1𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = �
1 | 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝐴
0 | 𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝐴𝐴 .
             (B3) 
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